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WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL SENTENCING IN
PLEA AGREEMENTS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
During the summer of 1997, the Department of Justice issued
a directive requiring all future federal plea agreements to in-
clude language providing that a defendant waive her statutory
right to appeal the sentence imposed by a judge' guaranteed by
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the "Act").2 Various
agreements in several federal jurisdictions previously had used
similar waiver language on an ad hoc basis.' Twice during the
summer of 1997, the issue arose in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia.4 Although several circuits have deemed
the waiver acceptable,5 Judges Paul L. Friedman and Harold H.
Greene ruled in separate hearings that the U.S. Attorney's office
could not include such a condition in any plea agreement.6
Though the U.S. Attorney's office subsequently withdrew the
language and proceeded contrary to the Department of Justice
1. See United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 44-45 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Memorandum to all U.S. Attorneys from John C. Keeney, Acting
Assistant Attorney General at 3 (Oct. 4, 1995) [hereinafter Keeney Memorandum]).
2. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-
742 (1994) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1994)).
3. These jurisdictions include, but are not limited to, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Feichtinger, 105 F.3d 1188 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2467 (1997); United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566 (5th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1990).
4. See United States v. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. 437, 439 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding
that a waiver made prior to sentencing cannot be made knowingly); Raynor, 989 F.
Supp. at 43-44 (finding that a waiver of the right to appeal, made prior to sentenc-
ing, is invalid because it is a waiver of an undefined right). The author of this Note
was a summer clerk for Judge Paul L. Friedman of.the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia when this issue arose.
5. See Feichtinger, 105 F.3d at 1190; Melancon, 972 F.2d at 567-68; Navarro-
Botello, 912 F.2d at 320-21; Wiggins, 905 F.2d at 52-53.
6. See Johnson, 992 F. Supp. at 438-39 (refusing to ratify a waiver of the right
to appeal found in a plea agreement); Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 43 (same); Transcript
of Plea Before the Honorable Paul L. Friedman United States District Judge at 7-22,
Raynor (No. CR 97-0186) [hereinafter Raynor Transcript].
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directive,' many other jurisdictions not bound by the District of
Columbia ruling continue to use waiver language as a precondi-
tion to any plea agreement.
This Note discusses the validity of plea agreement provisions
that require the defendant to waive the right to appeal sentenc-
ing as a condition to making a plea agreement. The first section
offers a brief historical review of the right to appeal sentencing,
the Department of Justice directive, the Judicial Conference's
consideration of the topic, and the specific history of the current
controversy over waiver provisions. The second section examines
legal issues, as reflected in cases and statutes. The third section
investigates public policy considerations favoring and opposing
enforcement of the waiver. In the fourth section, this Note pres-
ents another scholarly treatment of this issue, and concludes
that the proposed alternative is deficient. The fifth section pres-
ents another alternative that relies upon Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 11(e)(1)(C). This Note's proposed alternative com-
plies with the legal and public policy considerations that forced
a rejection of both the Department of Justice directive and the
previous scholarly treatment of the issue. Finally, this Note con-
cludes that the government should use Rule 11(e)(1XC) to effec-
tuate a plea in which a defendant sacrifices her right to appeal,
rather than requiring each plea agreement to include a waiver
of such right.
HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL SENTENCING AND OF
THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY
Prior to November 1, 1987,8 federal judges had nearly com-
plete discretion in the imposition of sentences.9 The criminal
defendant did not possess the right to appeal sentencing except
7. See Raynor Transcript, supra note 6, at 3-4. The author was present at the
hearing in which Harris Epps of the U.S. Attorney's office withdrew the offending
language.
S. This marked the effective date of a portion of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984. See 18 U.S.C. § 3557 (1994).
9. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972) (recognizing that a
trial judge has wide discretion in sentencing); see also Gore v. United States, 357
U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (finding that the Supreme Court has no power to change sen-
tencing absent legislation).
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through a habeas corpus action or in other limited circumstanc-
es.1° Habeas actions, however, were, and still are, limited proce-
durally, essentially to prevent defendants from having multiple
opportunities to appeal.1 The government also possessed limited
appellate rights regarding sentencing.1 2
Members of Congress found this state of affairs unacceptable
because it provided unfettered and unjustifiable judicial discre-
tion.13 Congress therefore sought to heighten the accountability
of federal trial judges and to generate uniformity within the
criminal justice system by creating a check on judges' sentencing
powers.14 Members who believed that a lack of uniformity often
led to disparate treatment of particular defendants also were
concerned about the rights of the accused.15 To remedy these
shortcomings, Congress drafted and passed the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984.16
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994). The Eighth Amendment provides protection from
unfair or improper sentencing. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-90 (1983).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
12. See United States v. Spilotro, 884 F.2d 1003, 1005-06 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding
that the government could not appeal a sentence because Congress provided it with
no such remedy in either 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1994) or 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), but
that the government could appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1994), which applies only
to certain dangerous offenders).
13. See William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility,
Role of the Offender, and Departures: Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of Feder-
al Sentencing Guidelines, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 181, 181 (1988) (providing an
overview of important policy decisions forming the Federal Sentencing Commission's
initial guidelines).
14. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f) (1994); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d
551, 556 (2d Cir. 1996); S. REP. No. 98-225, at 150-51 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.CAN. 3182, 3333-34; see also UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N,
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1-2 (Nov. 1995) (outlining the statutory mission of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL].
15. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legis-
lative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223,
225-81 (1993) (presenting an exhaustive discussion of the legislative history of the
Sentencing Reform Act and its antecedents); Steven E. Zipperstein, Certain Uncer-
tainty: Appellate Review and the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 621,
625-26 (1992) (arguing that one of the congressionaf purposes for the sentencing
guidelines is to ensure uniformity in sentencing).
In a 1978 study, the Department of Justice concluded that "sentencing policy
varies across jurisdiction." L. PAUL SurrON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL SEN-
TENCING PATIERNS: A STUDY OF GEOGRAPmC VARIATIONS 32 (1978).
16. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. if 3551-
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Congress designed the Sentencing Reform Act to make sen-
tences uniform and to afford all defendants the right to appeal a
sentence. 7 Appellate review ensures uniformity because appel-
late judges do not substitute their discretion for that of a trial
judge. Instead, appellate judges ascertain whether the trial court
properly applied the guidelines" and whether the record justi-
fies any departure from the sentence imposed by the trial
court.' 9 The Act does not indicate whether the defendant has the
power to waive this appellate right.
Since the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act, federal
prosecutors have incorporated waiver language about sentencing
in plea agreements on an ad hoc basis.2 ° Prior to the Justice
3742 (1994) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994)). For an exhortation of the principles of
review advanced by the American Bar Association in the 1970s, see STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 20-1.2 (2d ed. Tenta-
tive Draft 1978). The ABA recites and comments upon the traditional purposes of
appellate review of sentences:
The general objectives of sentence review are:
(i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having re-
gard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest;
(ii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the sentencing
power and by increasing fairness in the sentencing process;
(iv) to promote the development and application of criteria for sen-
tencing which are both rational and just.
Id
17. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f) (establishing the purposes of the Sentenc-
ing Commission and the right to appeal sentencing); Williams v. United States, 503
U.S. 193, 195 (1992) ("The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ... created the United
States Sentencing Commission and empowered it to promulgate guidelines establish-
ing sentencing ranges ... ."); Ready, 82 F.3d at 556 (stating that the purpose of
the Commission's guidelines is uniformity in sentencing); S. REP. No. 98-225, at 150-
51 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3334; SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL,
supra note 14, at 2.
18. See Williams, 503 U.S. at 198-99 (noting that appeals are allowed when the
sentence imposed violated the law or was an incorrect application of the guidelines).
19. See Donald A. Purdy, Jr. & Michael Goldsmith, Better Do Your Homework:
Plea Bargaining Under the New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, CRIM. JUST., Spring
1988, at 2, 4 (advising defense counsel to review the guidelines for new avenues of
relief).
20. For instance, in Judge Friedman's courtroom during the summer of 1997, some
plea agreements contained the waiver while others did not. The waiver was present
in a multi-defendant case in which Judge Friedman rejected the plea agreements.
See Raynor Transcript, supra note 6, at 3-4. In other cases, waiver language did not
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Department's 1997 directive, no federal waiver policy had been
promulgated, yet numerous plea agreements containing the
waiver language had been executed.2 Appellate courts have had
the opportunity to review many of these agreements and gener-
ally have held them to be enforceable.22
Not until the summer of 1997 did the government adopt
a uniform federal policy. 3 To hamstring "lawless district
court[s],"24 the Department of Justice handed down a directive
that prosecutors include the waiver language in all federal plea
agreements.25 The waiver language in one plea agreement reads:
[Defendant] voluntarily and knowingly waives the right to
appeal any sentence within the maximum provided in the
statute(s) of conviction, or the manner in which that sentence
was determined... or on any ground whatever. [The defen-
dant] also voluntarily and knowingly waives [his] right to
challenge the sentence or the manner in which it was deter-
mined in any collateral attack, including but not limited to a
motion brought under Title 28, United States Code, Section
2255. [The defendant] further acknowledges and agrees that
this agreement does not limit the government's right to ap-
peal a sentence, as set forth in Title 18, United States Code,
Section 3742(b). 6
A defendant who accepts this language explicitly forfeits her
right to appeal a sentence that is in excess of the Sentencing
exist and the Judge had no objection to taking the pleas.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Feichtinger, 105 F.3d 1188, 1190 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 2467 (1997); United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567-68
(5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 320-21 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 52-53 (4th Cir. 1990).
22. See Feichtinger, 105 F.3d at 1190; Melancon, 972 F.2d at 567-68; Navarro-
Botello, 912 F.2d at 320-21; Wiggins, 905 F.2d at 52-53.
23. See United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 44-45 (D.D.C. 1997) (quoting
Keeney Memorandum, supra note 1, at 3).
24. Id (quoting Keeney Memorandum, supra note 1, at 3).
25. See id (citing Keeney Memorandum, supra note 1, at 3).
26. United States v. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. 437, 438 (D.D.C. 1997) (quoting plea
agreement). Other plea agreements have contained variations on this language. For
instance, another agreement stipulated that the defendant "waive[s] the right to ap-
peal the sentence imposed in this case on any ground, including the right of appeal
conferred by Title 18, United States Code, section 3742." Melancon, 972 F.2d at 567
(quoting the plea colloquy engaged in by the trial court) (emphasis added).
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Guidelines but is below the statutory maximum, her right to
appeal a calculation error in the computation of criminal history
points and offense level, and her right to attack her conviction
on collateral grounds, such as cruel and unusual punishment or
disparate treatment.27 In short, the defendant loses the right to
appeal on "any ground whatever."
21
In addition to the language advanced by the Department of
Justice, the U.S. Judicial Conference is contemplating changing
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit such a plea.2s
That the Judicial Conference is considering making these chang-
es seems to indicate that such a waiver currently is not valid.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
judges to ensure that criminal defendants who have entered into
plea agreements have entered into the agreements voluntarily
and knowingly.3 ° Two judges on the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia have held that a plea with a waiver of the
sort discussed in this Note was invalid in that it violated the
requirements of Rule 11 and was contrary to sentencing guide-
line and contractual principles, standing fast against the tide
washing over other circuits.3
Post-conviction waiver of the right to appeal sentencing,
though a related topic, is not discussed in this Note.32 The waiver
27. See Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 43.
28. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. at 438 (quoting plea agreement).
29. See Raynor Transcript, supra note 6, at 21.
30. "The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first,
by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is
voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea
agreement." FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d).
31. See Johnson, 992 F. Supp. at 438 (Greene, J.); Raynor Transcript, supra note
6, at 14-16 (Friedman, J.). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has not ruled on this issue, though many other circuits have held
such agreements to be enforceable. See, e.g., United States v. Allison, 59 F.3d 43, 46
(6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1995).
32. Discussion of this topic has been presented elsewhere. See Gregory M. Dyer &
Brendan Judge, Criminal Defendants' Waiver of the Right to Appeal-An Unaccept-
able Condition of a Negotiated Sentence or Plea Bargain, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
649, 667-69 (1990) (claiming that arguments against waivers are magnified at the
sentencing stage).
This Note also does not discuss the general validity of plea agreements and var-
ious other appeal waivers. Commentators have substantially criticized the plea agree-
ment system in general, see generally Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
1024
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at the time of sentencing does not seem as problematic as the
waiver at the time of the plea agreement and Rule 11 colloquy
because such agreements more likely than not would include
mutually agreed upon sentencing terms under Rule 11(e)(1)(C)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.3
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING WAIVER OF THE RIGHT
TO APPEAL SENTENCING IN A PLEA AGREEMENT
Competing legal considerations form the bedrock for the posi-
tions of those favoring enforcement of waivers of sentencing ap-
peals and those opposing enforcement. This section presents the
arguments for both sides, offers assessments of the arguments,
and concludes that the legal considerations of those opposed to
mandatory waiver outweigh those of the supporters..
Favoring Waiver
Those who support waiver of the right to appeal sentencing,
like those who favor the Department of Justice's plan, make two
main legal arguments. First, they argue that the waiver is anal-
ogous to other rights waived. Second, they contend that plea
agreements are similar to contracts and that parties can negoti-
ate in a market transaction to obtain terms that are mutually
satisfactory, even mutually beneficial.
Proponents of waiver start with the straightforward proposi-
tion that one may waive any right: "Any right, even a constitu-
tional right, may be surrendered in a plea agreement if that
waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily."34 In United States
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1909 n.4 (1992) (discussing some of the
most prolific critics of plea agreements), and appeal waivers in plea agreements in
particular, see Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGs
CONST. L.Q. 127, 146-200 (1995) (positing that waivers chill a defendant's right to
appeal). There is no need to reiterate these concerns in this Note, which operates on
the assumed validity of the plea-agreement process.
33. The fifth section of this Note discusses Rule 11(e)(1)(C). Plea agreements made
in accord with the terms of Rule 11 do not suffer the same deficiencies of the De-
partment of Justice's plan. See infra notes 135-54 and accompanying text.
34. United States v. Ashe, 47 F.3d 770, 775-76 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Town of
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)).
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v. Mezzanatto,35 the Supreme Court held that defendants could
waive their rights under Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 410.6
FRE 410 provides that statements made during plea negotia-
tions may not be used against a defendant if the case were to go
to trial,37 but contains no express language about waiver.38 In
Mezzanatto, the defendant was charged with possession of meth-
amphetamine with intent to distribute.39 The government condi-
tioned the plea agreement on Mezzanatto's truthfulness and en-
sured his cooperation by requiring him to waive his rights under
FRE 410-as a condition of commencing negotiations-such that
the government could use any lie to impeach Mezzanatto should
the plea agreement fail.40 Mezzanatto failed to be truthful on at
least two issues, causing the prosecutor to cease plea negotia-
tions.4 Mezzanatto's case went to trial, at which time he denied
involvement in methamphetamine trafficking.42 The prosecutor
used the prior inconsistent statements to impeach Mezzanatto
and the court ultimately convicted him.43
The Court concluded that the wavier of a defendant's FRE 410
protection is well within the bounds of traditional waiver juris-
prudence." The Court analogized this waiver to the waiver of
one's right against double jeopardy, right to a jury trial, right
against self-incrimination, and right of confrontation.45 Propo-
nents of waiver argue that no inherent or functional difference
exists between waiver of the right to appeal sentencing and
those rights discussed in Mezzanatto.
35. 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
36. See id at 196.
37. See FED. R. EvID. 410. FRE 410 includes two narrow exceptions-when a
statement from the negotiations has been introduced, presumably by the defendant,
other statements may be considered as fairness requires, and when a pejury or
false statement charge arises out of negotiations that have taken place "under oath,
on the record and in the presence of counsel." IM
38. See icd
39. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 196.
40. See id. at 199.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id
45. See id at 200-03.
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Mezzanatto bears particular importance because there is no
waiver language in FRE 410,46 much like the lack of waiver lan-
guage in the Sentencing Reform Act.47 The Supreme Court rea-
soned that congressional silence creates a presumption favoring
waiver.'
Courts have dismissed the fear that a waiver of the right to
appeal cannot be informed: "[The uncertainty of Appellant's
sentence does not render his waiver uninformed."49 Essentially,
a waiver of the right to appeal sentencing was made knowingly
if the defendant recognized that he had a "right to appeal his
sentence and that he was giving up that right."5" When one for-
goes the right to a jury trial, one does not know the verdict. This
uncertainty in forsaking a trial is similar to the uncertainty ac-
companying a waiver of the right to appeal sentencing pursuant
to plea agreement.
The second legal argument made by proponents of the waiver
of the right to appeal sentencing is that a plea agreement is a
contract and "classical contract theory supports the freedom to
bargain over criminal punishment."51 Prosecutors have the right
to seek the maximum punishment and defendants have the
right to force prosecutors to meet the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.52 Each party has an interest that the other
party's right not be exercised. Prosecutors do not wish to expend
the time, the money, and the effort necessary to garner a crimi-
nal conviction with a maximum penalty. Defendants do not wish
to subject themselves to the potential for maximum punishment.
Both parties want to limit what the other party can do, therefore
46. See FED. R. EviD. 410.
47. See D. Randall Johnson, Giving Trial Judges the Final Wor& Waiving the
Right to Appeal Sentences Imposed Under the Sentencing Reform Act, 71 NEB. L.
REv. 694, 700 (1992).
48. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 203-04 ("[W]e will not interpret Congress' silence
as an implicit rejection of waivability.").
49. United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567-68 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing United
States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wiggins, 905
F.2d 51, 52 (4th Cir. 1990)). For a discussion of the knowledge requirement of a
valid waiver, see infra text accompanying notes 63-73.
50. Rutan, 956 F.2d at 830.
51. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 32, at 1910.
52. See id. at 1915.
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the situation is ripe for an agreement that satisfies both parties,
or at a minimum, is the least detrimental to both parties.
53
Waiver proponents argue that market forces dictate that par-
ties would not enter contracts and accept terms unless the
agreement was beneficial to both sides.5 In the quid pro quo of
plea agreements, defendants often trade their rights for prosecu-
torial promises of lesser charges or more lenient sentencing rec-
ommendations.55 The right to appeal sentencing is simply anoth-
er example of a right that can be exchanged for mutual benefit.
Sometimes, however, contracts do not result in mutual bene-
fit. Contracting involves risks-usually calculated risks-but
risks nonetheless. When neither party can control the risks and
the risks come to fruition with negative consequences for one or
all parties, the contract generally is enforced regardless.56
53. See iL.
54. See id. at 1914-15.
55. In Town of Newton v. Rurnery, 480 U.S. 386 (1986), Bernard Rumery ex-
changed his right to sue the Town of Newton under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) for the
prosecutor's promise to dismiss the criminal charges against him. See Rumery, 480
U.S. at 394-95. The Court held that the judicial system should not prevent Rumery
from making a decision that he perceived as beneficial to his interests because he
had no "public duty" to advance the public policy interest in enforcing appropriate
police conduct through section 1983 litigation. See idt at 395-97.
56. Possible grounds for voiding a contract include impossibility, impracticability,
or frustration. For all of these grounds, there is a question of the basic assumptions
of the agreement. For example, under the frustration doctrine, if, after a contract is
made, a party's principal purpose were substantially frustrated through no fault of
her own by an event or a nonoccurrence that was not a basic assumption of the
contract, that party no longer has to perform her remaining duties. See RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981).
The question then becomes whether the basic assumption in a plea agreement
is that the judge possesses the ultimate responsibility for sentencing, in which case
prosecutorial agreements do not hold absolutely, or whether the fundamental as-
sumption is that the criminal defendant will not be punished in excess of the terms
of the plea agreement. This question is answered simply by recognizing that the
judge holds final sentencing power, except in the limited case set forth in Rule
11(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See infra text accompanying
notes 135-43. It is unlikely that a criminal defendant could successfully mount an
impossibility, impracticability, or frustration claim to void a plea agreement. But see
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 32, at 1918 (laying forth the argument made by some
scholars that a plea agreement may be unenforceable due to contractual deficiency).
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Opposing Waiver
Five legal arguments suggest that the waiver of the right to
appeal is invalid on its face. First, a waiver must, by definition,
be made knowingly, and therefore cannot occur when certain
legal ramifications of the waiver remain indeterminate.57 Sec-
ond, Congress designed the Sentencing Reform Act to create ap-
pellate review that would ensure uniformity.5" The waiver un-
dercuts the uniformity that the law demands. Third, the waiver
condition functions as an adhesion contract. 9 The government
possesses all of the power,60 reflected by the fact that the gov-
ernment requires the inclusion of waiver language in plea agree-
ments, and that the waiver provision is unilateral and nonnego-
tiable. Related to this argument is that a waiver is only valid if
it were voluntary. Fourth, the waiver paragraph cannot consti-
tute a binding 'contract because it is not an accurate statement
of the law.6 Finally, the waiver of habeas corpus review pre-
vents a check on the constitutionality of conditions of confine-
ment.62
Knowledge Requirement
For a waiver to be valid, it must meet certain minimum re-
quirements. The Supreme Court expressed the elements of waiv-
er as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege."6' A valid waiver, then, "presupposes
an actual and demonstrable knowledge of the contours of the
right which is being waived."64 The waiver of the right to appeal
57. See infra text accompanying notes 63-73.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 74-81.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 82-84.
60. Though this claim is certainly an exaggeration, the unequal bargaining posi-
tions are readily apparent.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 85-92.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 93-94.
63. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see also McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (quoting Zerbst and holding that a Rule 11 waiver
may be valid only if there were "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege").
64. Calhoun, supra note 32, at 203 (citing, as an example, Jones v. Brown, 89
Cal. Rptr. 651 (Ct. App. 1970)).
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sentencing certainly raises the issue of whether the defendant
had knowledge of the implication of his waiver.
The actual sentence and the presentence report that factors
into that sentence cannot be known at the time of plea bargain,
and therefore an agreement that waives the defendant's right to
appeal often is uninformed and premature. Judge Friedman
characterized this argument in categorical terms: "It's this
Court's position that a defendant can never knowingly and intel-
ligently waive the right to appeal a sentence that has not yet
been imposed."65
If one were to compare the rights waived in a plea agreement
to other rights, one could see a distinct difference. In a typical
waiver, "the act of waiving the right occurs at the moment the
waiver is executed. For example: one waives the right to silence,
and then speaks; one waives the right to have a jury determine
one's guilt, and then admits his or her guilt to the judge."66 The
close temporal nexus of events supports the inference that a de-
fendant who waived such a right has done so knowingly.
Admittedly, there may be some uncertainty. "While one can-
not fully know the consequences of confessing or pleading guilty,
one does know what is being yielded up at the time he or she
yields it."6 7 Professor Robert Calhoun argues, "[Ihf there is any
one theme unifying the Court's guilty plea advisement cases...
it is that in order to enter a constitutionally valid plea, the de-
fendant must know precisely what is being given up as a conse-
quence of the plea."68 When a defendant waives her right to ap-
peal, a separate legal event is involved: "This right cannot come
into existence until after the judge pronounces sentence; it is
only then that the defendant knows what errors the district
court has made-i.e., what errors exist to be appealed, or
waived."69 Nothing can be imparted from attorney to client or
65. Raynor Transcript, supra note 6, at 7 (emphasis added); see United States v.
Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 571 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., concurring specially); United
States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 44 (D.D.C. 1997) (rejecting right to waive appeal
of sentencing pursuant to plea agreement).
66. Melancon, 972 F.2d at 571 (Parker, J., concurring specially).
67. Id- at 572.
68. Calhoun, supra note 32, at 203.
69. Melancon, 972 F.2d at 572 (Parker, J., concurring specially).
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from court to defendant that would indicate the nature and
scope of the waiver about to be made. For this reason, the
Mezzanatto analysis is inapposite.
The uncertainty accompanying the defendant's waiver can
yield very negative results, as witnessed in United States v.
Feichtinger." Frank Feichtinger entered into a plea agreement
containing a waiver similar to the kind presently at issue.71
Feichtinger later disputed the trial court's calculation of the sen-
tence.72 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that "an improper
application of the guidelines is not a reason to invalidate a
knowing and voluntary waiver of appeal rights."3 Defendants
who waive appellate rights in the Seventh Circuit, therefore, are
subject to the whim and caprice of sentencing judges and the
accuracy of unknown presentence report calculations.
This argument is the natural extension of the contract analy-
sis adopted by those favoring the inclusion of a waiver of the
right to appeal sentencing in all federal plea agreements. Parties
may agree to whatever terms they desire. A defendant would not
ratify a plea term unless she accepted that term. Defendants,
though, generally enter plea agreements for leniency purposes
and certainly would not enter them with the expectation of an
erroneously calculated sentence and an excessive penalty.
Mezzanatto is inapposite because the parallel does not exist
between a waiver of FRE 410 and a waiver of the right to appeal
sentencing. Mezzanatto assumes a certain level of knowledge
that may well exist in a waiver of FRE 410, but which cannot
exist in the waiver of the right to appeal sentencing. Two meta-
phors may prove helpful. Waiver of FRE 410 is like flipping a
coin-it will always land either heads up or tails up. A defen-
dant either strikes a deal or does not. If a deal were struck after
a FRE 410 waiver, the statements made during negotiations
would not be used. To the contrary, if a deal were not struck,
70. 105 F.3d 1188 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2467 (1997) (holding that
improper application of the sentencing guidelines does not invalidate a defendant's
waiver of the right to appeal).
71. See id. at 1190.
72. See id.
73. Id.
1031
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1019
the statements could be used. Waiver of the right to appeal sen-
tencing, however, is substantially different. Though one may
know all of the numbers between one and forty, one cannot
know, in a real sense, what six numbers will be selected in an
upcoming lottery drawing. Waiver of the right to appeal sentenc-
ing is more like a lottery than it is like flipping a coin.
Appellate Review and Sentence Uniformity
The Sentencing Reform Act first codified the right to appeal
sentences.74 Congress intended the statutory language to confer
power upon the appellate courts to rein in sentences that were
out of line.75 The Department of Justice's endeavors to restrict
appellate review of sentences weaken this check.
Through the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress intentionally
removed the power of district court judges to be the final step in
the penal process. 76 The Department of Justice's plan returns to
the courts the power that Congress had legislated away. Sen-
tence-appeal waivers "sanction[] district court usurpation of the
discretionary sentencing authority Congress expressly took away
from the federal trial courts in 1984."7 When the executive
branch tries to circumvent the legislative branch, it is the judi-
ciary's job to ensure that the executive branch is acting within
its power.78
Concurring specially in United States v. Melancon, Judge
Parker offered a variation on this rationale as to why the right
to appeal sentencing is not waivable. Appeals of sentences are
not an individual right, but a limitation of judicial authority.7 s
An individual therefore cannot waive appellate review."0 One
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994).
75. See generally Barry L. Johnson, Discretion and the Rule of Law in Federal
Guidelines Sentencing: Developing Departure Jurisprudence in the Wake of Koon v.
United States, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1697-716 (1998) (discussing appellate review
as intended by Congress under the Sentencing Reform Act).
76. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 1.
77. United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 574 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., con-
curring specially).
78. See United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 45 (D.D.C. 1997).
79. See Melancon, 972 F.2d at 573 (Parker, J., concurring specially).
80. This is analogous to nonwaivability of the subject matter jurisdiction require-
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can compare this construction of the right to appeal sentencing
with the right to be present at all phases of a trial, another
nonwaivable right.81
Waiver as an Adhesion Contract
The right-to-appeal-sentencing waiver creates a condition that
transforms an acceptable contract into an adhesion contract that
should be void on general contract principles. An adhesion con-
tract is a
[s]tandardized contract form offered to consumers of goods
and services on essentially "take it or leave it" basis without
affording consumer realistic opportunity to bargain and un-
der such conditions that consumer cannot obtain desired
product or services except by acquiescing in form contract.
Distinctive feature of adhesion contract is that weaker party
has no realistic choice as to its terms. Recognizing that these
contracts are not the result of traditionally "bargained" con-
tracts, the trend is to relieve parties from onerous conditions
imposed by such contracts. However, not every such contract
is unconscionable.8 2
In the plea agreement context, the government mandates that
the waiver be a part of the agreement or no agreement is had.83
It is not a bargaining chip in a poker game, but the ante
required even to sit at the table. The government has substan-
tial power and defendants have significantly less power.8 ' The
ment in federal court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also, e.g., Depex Reina 9
Partnership v. Texas Intl Petroleum Corp., 897 F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1990) (dismiss-
ing case on grounds of inadequate subject matter jurisdiction after numerous other
proceedings in the case).
81. See Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1257, 1258 n.43 (11th Cir. 1982)
(discussing nonwaivability in capital cases, -and noting that the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure do not limit nonwaivability to capital cases). See generally FED.
R. Cn1u. P. 43 (establishing the requirement that the defendant has the right to be
present throughout the trial process with limited exceptions).
82. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
83. See United States v. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. 437, 439 (D.D.C. 1997); Raynor
Transcript, supra note 6, at 1-6.
84. "ITihere is no equality in the position of the parties to this agreement."
Raynor Transcript, supra note 6, at 10; see also Johnson, 992 F. Supp. at 439 (stat-
ing that the plea agreement was similar to an adhesion contract).
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government has further leverage because it can delay sentences
in plea agreements that require cooperation as a condition.
The waiver of the right to appeal sentencing operates as Dam-
ocles's Sword over the head of a defendant. The satisfaction of
striking a favorable agreement that includes a waiver is, like
the Sword, suspended by a fine thread. The thread represents
the correct application of the sentencing guidelines by the judge
and an accurate presentence report. Any incorrect application
or inaccurate report may snap the thread, inflicting a mortal
wound on the defendant-a nonreviewable sentence.
Inaccurate Statement of the Law
The paragraph in the plea agreement indicating a mandatory
waiver of the right to appeal sentencing85 is not an accurate
statement of the law. 6 The government admits as much.87 If a
court were to accept the agreement blindly, it could not be cer-
tain that the government or the defense counsel had informed
the defendant adequately as to the scope of the waiver. The de-
fendant's attorney might not be advising him properly, therefore
the legal effect of the waiver provision in federal plea agree-
ments must be questioned.
The waiver provision omits a range of grounds on which a
defendant may appeal regardless of the waiver.88 For instance,
some courts have held the waiver ineffective if sentencing were
85. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
86. See Raynor Transcript, supra note 6, at 14-15.
87. Although the paragraph indicates a complete waiver of appellate rights, an
internal Department of Justice memorandum reads:
A sentencing appeal waiver provision does not waive all claims on ap-
peal. The courts of appeals have held that certain constitutional and stat-
utory claims survive a sentencing appeal waiver in a plea agreement. For
example, a defendant's claim that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel at sentencing ... that he was sentenced on the basis of
race . . . or that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum . . . will
be reviewed on the merits by a court of appeals despite the existence of
a sentencing appeal waiver in a plea agreement.
United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 46 (quoting Keeney Memorandum, supra
note 1, at 2).
88. See id.
1034
1999] WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL SENTENCING
the result of racial bias.89 This exception, however, appears no-
where in the agreement and the prosecution might never inform
the defendant of its existence. In Raynor, the government did
issue a separate letter to each defense counsel to apprise them
of the limited exceptions to the waiver.90 This is problematic,
though, because the plea agreement is an integrated agreement,
meaning that only the terms of the plea are binding and that no
other forms of agreement bind the parties.9 Defendants have
only ten days to determine whether any of the potentially undis-
closed exceptions apply to them. 2 Additionally, it is possible
that an appellate court would not agree with the prosecutor's
estimation of what an exception to the agreement might be.
Habeas Corpus
Waiver of habeas corpus prohibits defendants from raising
arguments regarding unconstitutional imprisonment.93 Habeas
corpus is one of the litany of waived appellate rights in the De-
partment of Justice directive. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established
by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court
89. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1994).
90. See Raynor Transcript, supra note 6, at 15.
91. See ic. at 15-16. The parol evidence rule would apply in this context. The parol
evidence rule states that
when the parties to a contract embody their agreement in writing and
intend the writing to be the final expression of their agreement, the
terms of the writing may not be varied or contradicted by evidence of
any prior written or oral agreement in the absence of fraud, duress, or
mutual mistake.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1116 (6th ed. 1990).
92. See FED. R. App. P. 4(b).
93. See generally JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, 1 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPus
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.3, at 16-17 (2d ed. 1994) (describing the tenets and
history of the writ of habeus corpus).
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which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence. 4
A plea agreement including a waiver provision expressly pre-
cludes collateral attacks under this doctrine.
No legal or policy argument supports the proposition that a
defendant suffering cruel and unusual punishment should have
a previous waiver of habeas corpus entered against her. A defen-
dant never expects that the treatment she would receive at the
hands of the penal system would be unconstitutional and yet
unchallengeable in court.
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING WAIVER OF THE
RIGHT TO APPEAL SENTENCING IN A PLEA AGREEMENT
Although the legal arguments opposing use or enforcement of
the waiver of the right to appeal sentencing are persuasive, the
public policy arguments favoring and opposing waiver also are
worth considering. The arguments favoring waiver are based on
concerns for judicial efficiency, closure, and uniformity of waiver
enforcement. Error correction, uniformity in sentencing, judicial
efficiency, and insulation of the prosecutor's office, meanwhile,
counsel against the waiver on public policy grounds.
Favoring Waiver
The arguments in favor of a mandatory waiver of the right to
appeal in federal plea agreements highlight a judicial system
taxed by voluminous criminal and civil dockets, and place a pre-
mium on measures that promote judicial economy. 5 With the
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994).
95. See, e.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (basing the decision to
excuse the petitioner's failure to develop his case on "concerns of ... judicial econo-
my"); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985) (including judicial economy as a fac-
tor in determining the reasonableness of the state's procedural rules); Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-33 (1979) (justifying the Court's use of collater-
al estoppel on judicial economy grounds). Judicial economy as a public policy goal is,
however, constrained by other principles and is inapplicable under certain constitu-
tional rights regimes. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487
U.S. 781, 795 (1988) ("[T]he First Amendment does not permit the State [through
the courts] to sacrifice speech for efficiency.").
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backlog of cases in the federal court system, cases take months
and even years to go to trial.96 Some might argue that the entire
system would come to a screeching halt but for plea agreements.
Plea agreements resolve more than eighty percent of federal
criminal cases.97 These agreements save the courts untold hours
of work, and waivers of appellate rights would further reduce
the load on an already taxed judiciary.
Legislatures and government agencies have undertaken to
eliminate what they perceive to be frivolous claims.9" An easy
way by which to reduce such claims is to limit appeals by par-
ties who have entered guilty pleas. Appeals by those who admit-
ted their guilt are particularly aggravating because they are
made by persons whose guilt is not in question. Additionally,
eliminating collateral attacks by convicts who have pled guilty
would reduce greatly the tens of thousands of lawsuits filed by
convicts each year.99 By carving out this section of appeals and
collateral attacks from the scope of allowable appeals, the gov-
ernment hopes to alleviate the burden placed upon the appellate
courts.0 ° By substantially reducing the total number of criminal
cases that could result in appeals, the government frees the ap-
pellate courts to focus on more pressing matters.
Moreover, those who are in favor of a waiver provision believe
that as a general rule, it is good policy for criminals, prosecu-
tors, victims, and society at large to know that criminal matters
are progressing rapidly to conclusion.0 1 Lack of closure may
96. See, e.g., Tamara Lytle, Florida May Get More Judges to Ease Load, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Mar. 4, 1998, at A24, available in 1998 WL 5333648; Sarah Pekkanen &
Nicole L. Gill, Judicial Vacancies Force Delays, Create Case Backlog, DETROIT NEws,
Feb. 8, 1998, at AS, available in 1998 WL 3814035.
97. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS-1990, at 502 tbl. 5.25 (Kathleen Maguire & Timothy J. Flanagan eds., 1990).
98. See Claire Papanastasiou, The Behind-Bars Bar, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 17,
1997, at B1.
99. See Tom Zoellner, Inmate Lawsuits Clutter Courts; Prisoners Get Nowhere
With Most Suits, SALT LAKE TRME., Nov. 6, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL
15234839.
100. See United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 44-45 (D.D.C. 1997) (quoting
Keeney Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1) (indicating that the government desired to
"reduc[e] the burden of appellate and collateral litigation involving sentencing issues").
101. At least two courts have cited this policy as a reason for upholding the waiver
of the right to appeal sentencing in plea agreements. See United States v. Rutan,
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have psychic costs on the parties involved in a given criminal
matter. For instance, a victim may not be able to "get past" a
crime perpetrated against him if the possibility of appellate re-
view were to loom in the future. Elimination of appellate review
thus brings closure to criminal cases with a greater rapidity
than previously attained.
A further argument in support of the waiver is that unless the
government uniformly enforces waiver agreements, the waiver
becomes useless because it will not serve public policy goals. A
case-by-case consideration of the waiver would encourage con-
victs to file appeals with the hope that they might be successful.
Permitting convicts to assert rights they have waived by ignor-
ing the binding effect of terms previously agreed to undercuts
the legitimacy of the entire plea agreement system. Such a case-
by-case review would encourage convicts to challenge any and
all waivers, even ones previously held enforceable.
Opposing Waiver
One of the primary arguments made by those who oppose a
mandatory waiver is that the criminal justice system, a system
of rules intended to be applied evenly, is operated by humans.
Humans are prone to make errors. It is therefore good public
policy to maintain a system that involves frequent checks to ver-
ify that no errors have occurred. The need for a system of checks
is especially prescient when individuals subject to the criminal
law, but not steeped in a legal education, confront the criminal
justice system. They cannot know all that goes into their de-
fense, therefore defendants need a system that protects them
from injustice. 102
Consider a hypothetical.0 3 Several months after conviction
and sentencing, a convict learns, through a great deal of media
coverage, that his attorney has since been disbarred for ineffec-
956 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318,
322 (9th Cir. 1990).
102. See generally Calhoun, supra note 32, at 178-79 (discussing the importance of
a system of checks in the criminal justice system).
103. In his discussion of waiver, Judge Friedman offered a hypothetical much like
the present example. See Raynor Transcript, supra note 6, at 15.
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tive assistance of counsel because his drug abuse impaired his
ability to offer an adequate defense. It becomes clear that the
attorney used drugs during the representation of the convict. As
a result of impaired judgment, the attorney recommended that
the client accept the plea agreement containing the waiver lan-
guage. The client now has no recourse. It goes against public
policy to punish those, like this hypothetical defendant, who
may have little control over situations that expose them. to
greater risk.
The system of checks, however, cannot be limitless. To have
limitless appeals would severely overburden the criminal justice
system. Other mechanisms to limit appeals, particularly frivo-
lous appeals, do exist. The U.S. Code lists the few grounds on
which a defendant may appeal sentencing.' For example, habe-
as corpus appeals are limited such that a convict may appeal
only once." 5 Lastly, it would not be very taxing to have stan-
dardized forms at the prosecutor's office to handle run-of-the-
mill appeals. Each appeal would get its due consideration, which
for some would warrant appellate action. For most others, how-
ever, such consideration would warrant summary dismissal.
When Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, it asserted
that uniformity in sentencing was a substantial public policy
goal. 1" 6 It sought to achieve that goal by creating sentencing
guidelines and providing convicts the right to appeal sentenc-
ing."0 7 Those who disfavor waiver of the right to appeal sen-
tencing assert that this policy goal is hamstrung when the exec-
utive branch hands down a directive that severely limits the
rights of criminal defendants to appeal their sentences.
Another argument disfavoring the waiver is that it actually
undercuts judicial economy because new appeals simply will as-
sert that the waiver was not valid. Appellants will attempt to
satisfy the threshold requirements and to demonstrate illegality
of sentencing on one of the other narrow grounds for appeal. If
the threshold requirement were met, review would occur as if
waiver were never to have happened.
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994).
105. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994).
106. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at 2.
107. See id-
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Further, the waiver insulates the prosecutor's office from judi-
cial review. The judiciary is supposed to act as a check on the
executive branch. The executive branch ought not be able to
overcome that safeguard by fiat; therefore, prosecutors should
not be able to insulate themselves from review. 08
ONE PROPOSED TREATMENT OF THE WAIVER
Legal and public policy considerations highlight the shortcom-
ings of the Department of Justice directive. There are several
possible methods available to remedy the deficiencies of the cur-
rent waiver provision. Professor D. Randall Johnson is one of few
scholars to present an in depth treatment of this issue and, for
this reason, his is the only alternative proposal addressed in this
Note. Professor Johnson rejects the "indiscriminate" enforcement
of plea agreement waivers of the right to appeal sentencing.'0 9
To resolve the conundrum of competing legal and public policy
issues, he proffers that limited enforcement of appeal-of-sentence
waivers is the best approach."10
Voluntary, deliberate, and informed appeal-of-sentence waiv-
ers should be enforced except when enforcement will preclude
review of claims that (1) sentence was imposed in violation of
the underlying substantive criminal statute, (2) in imposing
sentence the trial judge considered factors that trial judges
are prohibited by law from considering, and (3) in imposing
sentence the trial judge committed "plain error" in violation
of the Sentencing Reform Act. In addition, an appeal-of-sen-
tence waiver should not be enforced unless the waiver is mu-
tual, i.e., both parties-the defendant and government
alike-have expressly agreed to waive their right to appeal
sentence."'
Professor Johnson asserts that there is no policy justification for
the waiver when the underlying sentencing statute has been
108. See People v. Stevenson, 231 N.W.2d 476 (Mich. App. 1975) ("[P]ublic policy
forbids the prosecutor from insulating himself from review by either implicitly or
explicitly bargaining away a defendant's right to appeal .....
109. See Johnson, supra note 47, at 717.
110. See id at 717-19.
111. Id at 719-20.
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misapplied, for instance, when a court has dispensed an errone-
ous sentence.'12 Due process problems also arise because such
errors usually are not contemplated by the parties when enter-
ing an agreement."l 3
Although persuasive, at least one court has held that an error
by a judge is not reviewable when the defendant has waived her
right to appeal sentencing." "[A]n improper application of the
guidelines is not a reason to invalidate a knowing and voluntary
waiver of appeal rights."" 5 The Seventh Circuit appeared to ac-
cept the contract analysis of waiver, determining that, in plea
agreements, parties have contracted and are bound by that con-
tract. 16
When illegitimate factors influence a judge's determination of
sentence, a waiver in a plea agreement is not enforceable. 117 A
defendant's signing of a waiver should not influence a judge's
sentencing determination, and should not work to insulate the
judge from disparate treatment review."' Appellate review of
illegitimate sentencing certainly is the most praiseworthy form
of sentence review. This opportunity for review, however, under-
cuts the public policy benefits of judicial economy. Creation of
this exception increases the number of appeals because defen-
dants who feel that the judge may have discriminated against
them can raise this issue on appeal. To address this type of dis-
parate treatment appeal, the courts must devise some form
of legal framework, perhaps analogous to that established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green."9 Every appeal of sentence
112. See id. at 722.
113. See id. at 720.
114. See United States v. Feichtinger, 105 F.3d 1188 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 2467 (1997).
115. Id at 1190.
116. See id.
117. See id; see also United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that the trial judge impermissibly used naturalized status as a factor in
sentencing and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal).
118. Convicts can use habeas corpus actions to challenge disparate impact and dis-
parate treatment by judges in sentencing and other matters. See, e.g., McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291-99 (1987) (discussing habeas action equal protection claim
of disparate impact in capital punishment); Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408,
429 (D. Utah 1984) (discussing habeas review of Utah court's disparate treatment
regarding procedural issue).
119. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court indicated that
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would then include an attempt to reach the threshold of consid-
eration. Such a situation would increase, rather than decrease,
the burdens on the appellate courts.
Professor Johnson's third point is a plain error exception.120
He suggests a case-by-case review to determine whether a sen-
tence was harsher or more lenient than authorized by the sen-
tencing guidelines.'2 ' Borderline cases would require deference
to trial judges. 22 Professor Johnson explains that this concept is
vague, but compares it to Judge Learned Hand's analysis of venue
in civil cases.
123
Unfortunately, such an exception does not decrease the num-
ber of appeals reaching the courts. Appellate courts cannot re-
view trial court sentences sua sponte, therefore defendants will
still need to file appeals to demonstrate to the appellate courts
that trial courts committed plain error. Here, an appellant
would assert (1) that the lower court misapplied the sentencing
guidelines and hence her sentence falls in the area between the
maximum of the guidelines and the maximum of the statute, or
(2) that some other aspect of the plea agreement suffered from
the plaintiff in a Title VII action bears the initial burden of production to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. See id. at 802. To accomplish the prima facie
showing, a plaintiff must demonstrate
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id Once a plaintiff proves her prima facie case, the burden of production switches
to the defendant, who then has the opportunity to demonstrate that a legitimate
reason existed for the employment decision. See id. The plaintiff then has the re-
sponsibility of demonstrating that the articulated reason is pretext for the actual
discriminatory reason. See id at 804. The Court has clarified and modified the
McDonnell Douglas framework in subsequent decisions, such as Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), thereby developing an elaborate framework for disparate
treatment analysis. Devising a framework for disparate treatment in sentencing after
plea agreements would involve intricacies much like those that arise in employment
discrimination cases.
120. See Johnson, supra note 47, at 722.
121. See id.
122. See id
123. See id
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plain error. Regardless of which argument a defendant advanc-
es, the courts and prosecutors inevitably will spend vast
amounts of time addressing these appeals.'24
Lastly, Professor Johnson discusses the need for mutuality in
unilateral conditions.'25 He believes an agreement should not
bind either party unless both sides expressly agree to be
bound.'26 For support of this principle, he relies upon United
States v. Guevara.'27 Guevara held that a waiver should not be
enforced against a defendant unless it also binds the govern-
ment. 2 ' In other words, there is an implicit waiver by the gov-
ernment in cases where only the defendant is required to waive
certain rights and privileges explicitly.
It is unclear whether mutuality cures previous defects. As-
suming it does not, what benefits do both parties derive from
mutuality? Mutuality saves the government money that it might
spend on appeals of overly lenient sentences. Public policy dic-
tates that the government would want to correct sentences that
are too lenient.'29 For this very reason, the government includes
express language asserting that it does not waive its right to
appeal. Mutuality allows a defendant the possibility of escaping
with a sentence that is too lenient, but fails to address the prob-
lem of consistency. The mere contrapositive of the problem about
which Professor Johnson and this Note complain is no solution
to the problem.
Regardless of the weight of the above arguments, Johnson
accepts as a given that a waiver of the right to appeal sentenc-
ing can be informed.80 Such is not the case. As previously dis-
124. Professor Johnson does not make the plain-error doctrine any more appealing
by comparing it to venue. See id. Venue disputes can be very time consuming and
expensive. See generally Brian V. Breheny & Elizabeth M. Kelly, Note, Maintaining
Impartiality: Does Media Coverage of Trials Need to be Curtailed?, 10 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COmMENT. 371, 402 n.115 (1995) (noting that change of venue is an expensive
procedure).
125. See Johnson, supra note 47, at 723.
126. See id.
127. 949 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1991).
128. See id. at 707.
129. See Johnson, supra note 47, at 723.
130. See id, at 722.
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cussed, a defendant cannot know about that which has yet to be
determined." 1
Professor Johnson also assumes the waiver is voluntary."3 2
The voluntary nature of a waiver agreement is questionable.
The Department of Justice's policy is that waiver language is to
be an absolute condition precedent to the entry of a plea agree-
ment.
133
It is not a condition over which criminal defendants can bar-
gain. As the waiver part of the agreement mirrors an adhesion
contract, no reason exists to conclude that attaching four caveats
could remedy the larger problems with the mandatory waiver of
the defendant's right to appeal sentencing.
Professor Johnson's endorsement of a system that selectively
enforces plea agreements fails to achieve the public policy bene-
fits associated with plea agreements. 13 4 Professor Johnson's pro-
posal, stressing a case-by-case approach, eliminates the public
policy benefits of judicial efficiency.
Professor Johnson's alternative, then, fails to meet the legal
concerns raised in the second section of this Note and undercuts
the public policy benefits set forth in the third section. Given the
deficiencies of Professor Johnson's alternative and the problems
with the indiscriminate enforcement of the waiver that he as-
tutely highlights, this Note presents another option.
RECOMMENDATION
Although the Department of Justice plan has admirable goals,
the reality of the directive is that its costs outweigh its benefits.
Professor Johnson's alternative strives to ameliorate the costs,
but falls short because it reduces the potential benefits. This
Note recommends that to achieve the public policy benefits with-
out suffering the legal pitfalls, the waiver of the right to appeal
sentencing should never be enforced in plea agreements that
leave sentencing completely indeterminate until a later date.
131. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
132. See Johnson, supra note 47, at 706.
133. See Raynor Transcript, supra note 6, at 1-6.
134. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
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Instead, if the government were to choose to seek a sentence
with limited appellate review, it should turn to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(C), a universal rule that the govern-
ment could use in all criminal plea agreements.
13 5
Under Rule 11, counsel for the government and for the defen-
dant may "agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate dis-
position in the case."136 When the court reviews such an agree-
ment, it may accept, reject, or defer the agreement.137 If the
court were to accept the plea agreement, it would reduce the
plea agreement and the sentence to a formal judgment.138 If the
court were to reject the plea agreement, it would have to afford
the defendant the opportunity to withdraw the plea agreement
and inform the defendant of the potentially adverse consequenc-
es of a failure to withdraw.1 3 9 The defendant and the govern-
ment then have the opportunity to recast the plea agreement in
terms acceptable to the court.
Congress has legislated limitations on the right to appeal sen-
tencing in plea agreements adopted in accordance with Rule
11(e)(1)(C). 140 These statutory limitations are unlike the limita-
tions imposed by the Department of Justice directive, in that
they are not defective in relation to law or public policy consider-
ations.
Title 18, United States Code, section 3742(c) provides:
In the case of a plea agreement that includes a specific sen-
tence under rule 11(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure-
(1) a defendant may not file a notice of appeal under para-
graph (3) or (4) of subsection (a) unless the sentence imposed
is greater than the sentence set forth in such agreement; and
(2) the Government may not file a notice of appeal under
paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (b) unless the sentence im-
posed is less than the sentence set forth in such agreement.'4'
135. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(C).
136. Id-
137. See FED. R. CRnI. P. 11(e)(2).
138. See FED. R. CRImi. P. 11(e)(3).
139. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(4).
140. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c) (1994).
141. Id.
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Paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section give the defendant the
right to appeal such an agreement if the sentence imposed were
a violation of law142 or a misapplication of the sentencing guide-
lines.14' A judge's options are limited by the nature of a Rule
11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement, therefore, an appeal under para-
graphs (1) or (2) is unlikely.
Rule 11 and the Legal Considerations
Under an agreement executed pursuant to Rule 11, a defen-
dant waives a right that is more certain than the waiver in the
Department of Justice plan. The criminal defendant knows the
length of the sentence to which she is agreeing and, once the
agreement is accepted, she knows that the judge may not devi-
ate from the terms of the agreement. The increased knowledge
allows the defendant to assess accurately the nature of the right
she is relinquishing upon entry into the plea agreement. Sen-
tencing ceases to be a remote concept and is a separate legal
occurrence in only the most formalistic sense.
The Department of Justice directive raises a substantial fear
that habeas corpus and other collateral attacks on sentencing
will be limited. Rule 11 preserves the defendant's right to wage
a collateral attack when a violation of law in sentencing occurs,
for instance, an Eighth Amendment violation.
Rule 11 agreements are, by definition, mutually binding.'4
Both the lack of mutuality and the implication of mutuality are
therefore removed from consideration. The concerns raised in
Guevara regarding parties who did not adopt mutually binding
terms ceases to be a problem." The government is no longer in
a position counter to its contracted position in the plea agree-
ment. Under a contract analysis, it is untenable to impute a
term into one party's obligations when, as part of an integrated
agreement, that party expressly rejected such a term.146 The gov-
142. See id § 3742(a)(1), (c)(1).
143. See id § 3742(a)(2), (c)(1).
144. See id § 3742(c)(1)-(2).
145. See United States v. Guevara, 949 F.2d 706, 707 (4th Cir. 1991).
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209-16 (1981).
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ernment also is insulated from a sentence that it believes is too
lenient. Rule 11 agreements require that both parties expressly
commit to limiting the right to appeal.
Rule 11 and Public Policy
This Note has reviewed several issues of public policy, includ-
ing judicial economy and closure of criminal matters.147 The.Rule
11 plea agreement successfully addresses these two consider-
ations, along with all of the other policy issues-uniformity of
waiver enforcement, error correction, uniformity in sentencing,
and preventing the insulation of the prosecutor's office.
Judicial efficiency is a laudable public policy goal as well as a
constitutional requirement,'" regardless of one's predilections
about the waiver of the right to appeal sentencing as set forth
above.'49 The appeal-of-sentence waiver focuses on judicial econo-
my at the appellate level. Assuming, arguendo, that appeals
from sentences set pursuant to plea agreements'consume an un-
necessarily large amount of resources, limiting the right to ap-
peal would reduce the appellate docket. Rule 11 plea agreements
contain limited appellate rights.50 If appeals of such sentences
were not to occupy substantial court time, Rule 11 would not
create an increase in the amount of appellate work because of
the limits within the Rule.
147. These policy considerations have driven at least one state to limit appeals of
convictions and sentences subsequent to plea agreements:
The amendments to [Arizona] Rules 17.1, 17.2 and 27.8, unlike those to
Rule 32, were not motivated solely by the need to make changes in court
rules to conform to the directive in the Victims' Bill of Rights that there
be a " . . . prompt and final conclusion of the case after the conviction
and sentence." While influenced to some extent by victims' rights consid-
erations, the changes were the result of a joint effort undertaken by the
Arizona Attorney General and the Arizona Court of Appeals. Their goal
was to free themselves from the burden of a staggering appellate case-
load whose numbers had become swollen, in recent years, by appeals
from plea agreements which were required, by law, to be considered.
Charles R. Krull, Criminal Justice in America-Part One: Eliminating Appeals from
Guilty Pleas, ARIZ. AmT., Oct. 1992, at 34-35 (citations omitted).
148. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. ... ").
149. See supra text accompanying notes 34-94.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 140-43.
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Although plea agreements expedite the closure of a given
criminal matter, the presence of broad sentence appeal rights
creates an air of indeterminacy. To lessen this sense of indeter-
minacy, appellate rights must be curtailed in a constitutional
manner. Rule 11 accomplishes this goal by increasing the
amount of knowledge and voluntariness possessed by criminal
defendants who enter into these agreements.
Proponents desire indiscriminate enforcement of the waiver to
give meaning to the agreements so as to achieve the other public
policy considerations."l 1 For a number of reasons, indiscriminate
enforcement is impossible;152 however, with Rule 11 plea agree-
ments, enforcement can be, and is, maximized through narrow
appellate rights. Unless a convicted criminal meets the statutory
threshold for an appeal, she may not challenge the length of the
sentence. Unlike the Department of Justice waiver, the Rule 11
waiver has no caveats that the government may neglect to share
with the convicted criminal.
Rather than remedying errors, Rule 11 plea agreements pre-
vent errors from occurring. By devising a sentence below the
statutory maximum and within the sentencing guidelines with
consent of both parties, both the prosecution and the defendant
receive notice of the sentence and have an opportunity to negoti-
ate for a sentence to their liking. Rule 11 plea agreements must
meet the requirements of the present sentencing guidelines,
which force plea agreements to meet the congressionally man-
dated policy of sentence uniformity. The policy. of uniformity,
then, is achieved to the same degree as it would be when a trial
judge sets a post-conviction sentence according to the sentencing
guidelines.
Finally, the Rule 11 plea agreement allays a concern of oppo-
nents of the waiver that prosecutors' offices would be able to
insulate themselves from review by appellate courts.15 Rule 11
plea agreements must be within sentencing guidelines and
151. See Johnson, supra note 47, at 709-10 (discussing United States v. Navarro-
Botello, 912 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1990), and United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51
(4th Cir. 1990), and the public policy benefits from "wholesale enforcement").
152. See supra text accompanying notes 102-07.
153. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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should be accepted by judges taking the pleas. 4 These two ele-
ments reduce the possibility of prosecutorial misconduct.
Rule 11 advances the public policy considerations of both the
proponents and the opponents of the waiver. Because it achieves
such success on the public policy front, Rule 11 plea agreements
are preferable, on public policy grounds, to plea agreements un-
der the Department of Justice plan.
Rule 11 and Professor Johnson's Proposal Compared
This Note critiqued each element of Professor Johnson's pro-
posal directly, and examined his two assumptions-that such a
waiver could be knowing and voluntary.' For the recommenda-
tion advanced above to be a worthwhile alternative, it must sur-.
mount the criticisms leveled at Professor Johnson's proposal.
First, this Note critiqued Professor Johnson's argument by
stating that even though one would believe errors in calculation
to be appealable, courts have held that a waiver of the right to
appeal sentences includes a waiver of the right to appeal incor-
rectly calculated sentences.'56 The proposal advocated by this
Note avoids this problem in two ways. First, because the parties
consent to the length of the penalty, an appeal for an excessively
lengthy sentence is unlikely and unnecessary.'57 Second, the
right to appeal a sentence in excess of that in the Rule 11 plea
agreement is guaranteed by statute. 58 Professor Johnson's sug-
gestion that a concern for sentencing error justifies the waiver
has been rejected by at least one court,159 and does not manifest
itself in this Note's proposal that the government enter Rule 11
plea agreements rather than use waiver language.
154. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at § 6B1.2 & commen-
tary. Plea agreements can depart downward from the sentencing guidelines, but
must be justified under the departure rules. See id
155. See supra text accompanying notes 130-33.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73, 114-15.
157. Certainly, if a judge were to impose a sentence in excess of that agreed to by
the defendant and the government without following the procedural safeguards in
Rule 11(e)(3)-(4), both the defendant and the government would be entitled to ap-
peal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c)(1)-(2) (1994).
158. See United States v. Feichtinger, 105 F.3d 1188, 1190 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 2467 (1997).
159. See id.
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Second, although disparate treatment is always a possibility,
especially in open plea agreements with waiver language, dispa-
rate treatment or other violations of the law are less likely to
occur in a Rule 11 plea agreement. The plea agreement and the
criminal sentence are substantially insulated from judicial ille-
gality because the parties mutually consent and the court acts
merely to ratify the plea agreement. The court can only ratify or
reject, therefore it does not have the opportunity to inject its
own personal biases into the criminal penalty.1
60
Third, plain error does not create a problem under this pro-
posal because error would not exist. The parties must consent to
the length of the penalty set forth in the plea agreement. Parties
would not consent to terms in excess of or less than those set
forth in the sentencing guidelines because such would create the
statutory right to appeal. The defendant does not want the gov-
ernment to appeal a sentence that might be too lenient. The gov-
ernment does not want the defendant to appeal a sentence that
might be too excessive. Both parties will therefore settle on a
penalty within the guideline range, eliminating the possibility of
plain error.
Fourth, Rule 11 plea agreements satisfy Professor Johnson's
desire for mutuality. These agreements are, by their very na-
ture, mutual. Unlike implied mutuality, which disregards the
wishes of one party, Rule 11 plea agreements require express
mutuality. As such, a court could not impute terms into the
agreement.
The concern over whether the defendant's waiver is knowing
and voluntary has been addressed previously.161 To reiterate, a
Rule 11 plea agreement meets the requirement of knowledge
because a defendant is well aware of the sentence that is to be
imposed. Title 18, United States Code, section 3742 expressly
160. Although it is possible that a court could manifest its bias by selectively re-
jecting Rule 11(e)(1)(C) pleas, it is unlikely. The procedural safeguards would in-
crease the court's opportunity cost in setting sentences should the court wish to re-
ject the plea agreement as consented to by the parties. Additionally, courts are re-
luctant to second-guess the government in its assessment of the proper penalty for
crimes charged. See, e.g., United States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 1551 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 879 (1994).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 63-73.
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delineates the three grounds on which a defendant may appeal a
final sentence.162 Two of those grounds-violation of the law and
incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines-are disfa-
vored because consent alters the judge's role to that of ratifier.
The last ground for appeal-that a sentence exceeds the agreed-
to terms-provides a necessary check on the judge. Rule 11 ame-
liorates the potential uncertainty problems, therefore, the defen-
dant's waiver under Rule 11 is made knowingly.
Rule 11 plea agreements, like plea agreements generally, are
by their very nature voluntary. The government cannot force a
defendant to enter a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea.163 Rule 11 presents
the defendant with several plea options.164 This situation differs
substantially from the language that the Department of Justice
promulgated in 1997 requiring incorporation of the waiver into
all federal plea agreements.
In sum, Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreements do not suffer from
the same deficiencies as Professor Johnson's proposal of limited
enforcement ofwaiver-of-sentence-appeal plea agreements.165 The
range of cases in which'there is an agreement and a subsequent
appeal is likely to be more narrow under Rule 11 than under the
Department of Justice plan or Professor Johnson's proposal.166
162. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994).
163. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d).
164. See FED. R. CaM. P. 11(a)(2).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 109-33.
166. This analysis, of course, disregards those plea agreements already reached that
include mandatory waiver language. There are three options in dealing with these
extant agreements. First, the agreements could be enforced in those jurisdictions
that permit enforcement and held invalid in those jurisdictions that find the lan-
guage offensive to law and public policy, necessitating a new plea agreement. Sec-
ond, all of the agreements could be held invalid, necessitating a renegotiation by the
parties. Third, all of the agreements' terms, save for the waiver, could be enforced.
The first option-validity for some, invalidity for others-is decidedly unsatisfac-
tory. It fails to recognize the legal considerations that would make waiver offensive
in any jurisdiction and undercuts the public policy goals of uniformity and certainty.
The second option-invalidity for all-potentially would crush the federal prose-
cutorial system with paperwork and negotiations. Such an option proves unsatisfacto-
ry because of the high costs associated with renegotiating all of the voided plea
agreements. Additionally, significant problems arise when one considers that all
those whose pleas were declared invalid would be released from incarceration. The
costs and risks would be staggering.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Department of Justice plan to incorporate a
waiver of the right to appeal sentencing in all future federal
plea agreements fails to meet legal and public policy consider-
ations. The waiver cannot be valid because defendants cannot
knowingly make such a waiver. Congress designed the right to
appeal sentencing to ensure uniformity in sentencing. The right
to appeal thus functions as a source of judicial authority over
the sentencing court and not as an individual right. The waiver
does not achieve the public policy goals of economy, closure, and
uniformity of enforcement because the waiver merely creates a
two-tiered appeal in which defendants attack the validity of the
waiver-as a threshold question-before addressing their under-
lying substantive appellate arguments.
Professor Johnson's suggestion of limited enforcement of the
waiver fails to recognize the basic problems of the lack of knowl-
edge and voluntariness. Additionally, it undercuts all of the pub-
lic policy goals advocated because the exceptions created gener-
ate additional litigation on the appellate level.
This Note's proposal that the federal government use Rule
11(e)(1)(C) plea agreements when it wishes to effectuate a plea
in which a defendant sacrifices some of her rights to appeal
meets the challenges posed on legal and public policy levels. The
criminal sentence is determined in the plea agreement, therefore
the defendant has the requisite amount of information to make
a knowing and voluntary choice. Such plea agreements also
achieve the public policy benefits of judicial economy and closure.
The third option-enforcement of all terms except the waiver-would reduce the
substantial costs associated with the second option, increase the uniformity lacking
in the first option, and pay heed to the legal considerations ignored in the first op-
tion. There is a precedent for this third option. See United States v. Bushert, 997
F.2d 1343, 1350-54 (11th Cir. 1993). In Bushert, the court held that the "remedy for
an unknowing and involuntary waiver is essentially severance," that is, the waiver
"is severed or disregarded ... while the remainder of the plea agreement is en-
forced as written and the appeal goes forward." Id- at 1353. Although the Eleventh
Circuit in Bushert discussed a particular instance in which the waiver was unknow-
ing and involuntary, the argument in this Note is that all such waivers are unknow-
ing and involuntary.
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The government should, therefore, forgo the waiver of the right
to appeal sentencing as part of a plea agreement and enter, in-
stead, into plea agreements under Rule 11(e)(1)(C).
David E. Carney
